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Preference Reversals Without the Independence Axiom
By JAMESC. COX AND SETHEPSTEIN*
The preference reversal phenomenon was believed to be inconsistent with the
transitivity axiom of decision theory. However, recent papers have demonstrated
that previously observed preference reversals could be explained by subject
violations of the independenceaxiom or the compoundlottery axiom. The present
paper reports the results of experiments in which a substantial proportion of
subject responsesviolate the asymmetryaxiom. These results are inconsistent with
expected utility theoryand its generalizations.
alleged to be inconsistent with the transitivity axiom of decision theory.'
David Grether and Charles Plott (1979)
noted some possible problems in earlier experimental designs for preference reversal
experiments. Three of these were absence of
salient monetary payoffs, lack of control for
wealth effects, and absence of a possibility
for subjects to record indifference.2 Grether
and Plott designed some experiments that
did not have the problems of earlier work.
However, it was subsequently demonstrated
by Charles Holt (1986) and Edi Karni and
Zvi Safra (1987) that the Grether-Plott experimental design cannot discriminate between subject responses that are inconsistent
with the independence axiom of expected
utility theory and responses that are inconsistent with more fundamental postulates of
rationality such as transitivity. Furthermore,
Uzi Segal (1988) showed that the GretherPlott experimental design cannot discriminate between violations of the transitivity
and compound lottery axioms. Therefore, the
Grether-Plott experimental results do not
support their conclusion that subjects frequently violate transitivity.

Economic theories of decision making under uncertainty imply consistency of choice
and valuation that seems to be violated by a
substantial percentage of subject responses
in many experimental studies. This puzzling
behavior has become known as the preference reversal phenomenon. A preference reversal can be explained with the following
example. A subject is offered a direct choice
between two lotteries. One of the lotteries
offers a high probability of a relatively small
monetary payoff (hereafter referred to as the
P or probability bet), and the other lottery
offers a low probability of a relatively large
monetary payoff (hereafter referred to as the
$ or money bet). In addition, the subject's
minimum selling price is elicited for each
lottery. A preference reversal occurs when a
subject places a lower selling price on the
directly chosen lottery. Given that preferences are monotone (more wealth or income
is preferred to less), preference reversals were

*Department of Economics, University of Arizona,
Tucson, AZ 85721, and Department of Economics,
DePaul University, Chicago, IL 60604-2287, respectively. We are grateful for financial support from the
National Science Foundation under grant no. SES8404915 and the Economic Science Laboratory of the
University of Arizona. We have benefited from discussions with Brian Binger, Elizabeth Hoffman, Mark Isaac,
Mark Machina, Ronald Oaxaca, Charles Plott, and
Michael Ransom. We especially want to thank David
Grether and an anonymous referee for comments and
suggestions that significantly improved the paper.

'Grether and Plott (1979, p. 623) provide a detailed
explanation of the "intransitivity" interpretation of the
traditional preference reversal.
2"Saliency" is one of the sufficient conditions ("precepts") for conducting a valid controlled microeconomic experiment; these precepts are explained in Smith
(1982).
408

This content downloaded from 131.96.28.172 on Mon, 11 Jan 2016 19:02:27 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

VOL. 79 NO. 3

COXAND EPSTEIN: PREFERENCE REVERSALS

In this paper, we present experimental designs that do not contain any compound
lotteries and do not require the independence axiom to interpret the results. Therefore, any reversals of revealed preferences
for lotteries that are observed in our experiments cannot be attributed to subject violations of the compound lottery axiom or the
independence axiom. In fact, the results of
our experiments are that a substantial proportion of subject responses violate the
asymmetry axiom. This type of reversal is
inconsistent with expected utility theory and
more general decision theories that relax the
independence axiom.
The design of our experiments, and the
pattern of reversals that they produce, both
differ in essential ways from previous preference reversal experiments. Thus we will refer
to the reversals that we observe as "choice
reversals," as distinct from the traditional
preference reversal phenomenon.3
I. EconomicTheoryandExperimental
Design
Economic theories of decision making under risk are concerned with choices among
actions that yield outcomes that matter. This
body of theory is not intended to explain
how an agent might choose from among
actions that yield consequences of no importance to the agent. Therefore, the relevance
to economics of experiments involving hypothetical choices can be questioned. In preference reversal experiments, the critical
distinction is between those experiments involving hypothetical choices among lotteries
and those experiments involving real choices
among lotteries such that the chosen lotteries
are played and the resulting prizes (usually
cash payoffs) are delivered to the subjects.

3One referee commented that the preference reversal
phenomenon occurs when a subject chooses the P bet
and places a higher selling price on the $ bet, and that it
does not occur when a subject chooses the $ bet and
places a higher selling price on the P bet. Another
referee commented that the preference reversal phenomenon can only occur in experiments that use a
(selling) price elicitation mechanism.
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Of course, it is an empirical question whether
economically unmotivated choices are, in fact
significantly different from economically motivated choices.4 Nevertheless, the results of
preference reversal experiments involving
only hypothetical choices cannot provide a
convincing challenge to economic theory.
Economic theories 6f decision making under risk explain how variations in wealth can
affect choices. Thus an agent with wealth w
may prefer lottery A to lottery B but that
same agent with wealth wi 0 w may prefer
lottery B to lottery A. Therefore, the results
of preference reversal experiments that allow
a subject's wealth to change between choices
cannot provide a convincing challenge to
economic theory unless it can be shown that
wealth effects cannot account for the results.
Economic theories of decision making under risk provide explanations of optimal
portfolio choice. Such theories explain why
an agent might prefer lottery A to lottery B
but prefer the portfolio (A, B) to the portfolio (A, A). If the portfolio is accumulated by
sequential choice of A over B and then B
over A, an apparent preference reversal could
consist of choices that construct an agent's
optimal portfolio. Therefore, the results of
preference reversal experiments that allow a
subject to accumulate a portfolio of lotteries
cannot provide a convincing challenge to
economic theory unless it can be shown that
the resulting portfolio is dominated by an
alternative feasible portfolio (by, say, firstorder stochastic dominance).
Expected utility theory is the most familiar economic theory of decision making under risk. An expected utility functional
obtains its simple form of linearity in the
probabilities as a consequence of the independence axiom. An experimental design
that requires the independence axiom to interpret subject responses as preference rever-

4Grether and Plott in preference reversal experiments
and David Grether (1980, 1981) in experiments on
Bayes' rule have made important contributions in testing the effect of financial motivation on subject responses.
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sals can provide a convincing challenge to
expected utility theory, but it cannot provide
a challenge to more general decision theories
that do not include the axiom. This point is
important to evaluating the implications of
earlier preference reversal experiments. In an
attempt to get the subjects to reveal their
certainty equivalents for the lotteries, researchers have commonly used the selling
price elicitation procedure introduced in
G. Becker, Morris DeGroot, and Jacob Marshak (BDM, 1964). In this BDM procedure,
a subject states the minimum price at which
he would sell a lottery. An offer to purchase
is then selected randomly from some distribution (usually, a uniform distribution). If
this offer exceeds the stated price, the subject
sells the lottery for the amount of the offer;
if the offer is below the stated price, the
subject retains the lottery. The BDM procedure is designed to be a dominant strategy
revelation mechanism. However, in preference reversal experiments the selling prices
that are elicited are for lotteries. Since the
BDM procedure is itself a lottery, its use in
preference reversal experiments creates compound lotteries. The compound lottery and
independence axioms allow one to "reduce"
the compound lotteries and to interpret the
elicited prices as certainty equivalents. But
Karni and Safra (1987) have shown that the
BDM procedure can elicit prices that are
different from, and may be in reverse order
to, the certainty equivalents of the respective
lotteries if a subject's behavior does not satisfy the independence axiom. Furthermore,
Segal has demonstrated that a similar reversal can occur if a subject's behavior does not
satisfy the compound lottery axiom. Therefore, any preference reversal experiment that
uses the BDM procedure cannot discriminate between violations of the independence
and compound lottery axioms and other,
more problematic inconsistencies with decision theory such as intransitivities.
II. Earlier Experimental Work

Preference reversal experiments were first
reported in papers by Sarah Lichtenstein
and Paul Slovic (1971, 1973) and Harold
Lindman (1971). These experiments are part

J UNE 1989

of a much larger group of experiments whose
results have been interpreted as calling into
question economic theories of rational choice
(Slovic and Lichtenstein, 1983). Subsequent
preference reversal experiments were reported by Grether and Plott, Werner Pommerehne, Friedreich Schneider, and Peter
Zweifel (1982), Robert Reilly (1982), and
Joyce Berg, John Dickhaut, and J-ohnO'Brien
(1985). All of these papers report interesting
experiments. However, the generality of the
implications for economics of all of their
results can be questioned.
Grether and Plott discussed preference reversal experiments that preceded theirs;
hence, we will begin our discussion with
their paper. The Grether-Plott experimental
design had the following properties. The subjects were divided into two groups. One
group made hypothetical choices. The other
group made real choices with salient monetary rewards. One of each subject's choices
in the financially motivated group was randomly selected for cash payoff at the end of
the experiment. This random selection procedure was used to control for possible
wealth and portfolio effects. In addition, the
BDM procedure was used for both groups.
Grether and Plott found a high proportion
of preference reversals for both groups. Their
experimental design can support a challenge
to expected utility theory. But it cannot support a challenge to more general decision
theories that do not involve the independence axiom (Soo Hong Chew, 1981; Peter
Fishburn, 1983; Mark Machina, 1982;
Menahem Yaari, 1987). All of the GretherPlott experiments used the BDM procedure.
Therefore, their experimental design cannot
discriminate between violations of the independence and compound lottery axioms and
violations of transitivity for the reasons explained by Karni and Safra (1987) and Segal
(1988). Furthermore, as explained by Holt
(1986), the Grether-Plott random selection
procedure used in the experiments with cash
payoffs also creates a compound lottery and,
hence, an inability to discriminate between
violations of the independence axiom and of
transitivity.
Pommerehne et al. addressed three potential problems in Grether and Plott's experi-
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mental design. First, they questioned whether
the subjects were sufficiently motivated. This
led them to increase the point (" play
money") payoff by a factor of 100; however,
the conversion rate of play money into cash
was not known in advance by the subjects.5
Second, Pommerehne et al. contended that
nearly equal expected payoffs in Grether and
Plott's P and $ bets could have resulted in
subject boredom, effectively raising decision
costs above expected return. This led them
to run a set of experiments in which each
lottery in a pair had a different expected
value than the other. Finally, they questioned whether inexperienced subjects understood the random decision selection procedure. This led them to provide their
subjects with an opportunity to learn the
mechanics of this procedure prior to making
their final decisions. Their results indicated
that preference reversal was robust. They
failed to eliminate reversals, and only the
first treatment, increased incentives, resulted
in a significant reduction in their frequency.
The description of the experimental design
in Pommerehne et al. is inadequate for ascertaining their actual procedures. They did
write that "The design of our experiments is
basically the same as that used by G-P"
(Pommerehne et al., 1982, p. 571). We presume that this statement means that they
used the BDM and random selection procedures. Therefore, the implications of their
results are limited to expected utility theory
for the reasons explained by Holt, Karni and
Safra, and Segal.
Reilly also addressed the questions about
possible insufficient incentives and subject
confusion in the Grether-Plott (1979) experiments. He altered the design by increasing
the dollar amounts at risk in the lotteries

5This feature of the experimental design has some
potential problems. Since a subject does not know the
conversion rate of play money into cash but, presumably, has some expectations about it, yet another compound lottery has been created. In addition, the conversion rate depends on the choices of all of the subjects;
hence there exists an uncontrolled externality among
the subjects in cash rewards.

RE VERSA LS
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and by increasing the amount of instruction
given to the subjects. Although their frequency was lowered, he found that preference reversals were still common. Reilly's
experiments used the BDM procedure and
the random decision selection procedure;
therefore, the implications of his experimental results are confined to expected utility
theory.
Berg et al. (1985) attempted to generate
consistent choices from their subjects by an
arbitrage procedure which forced them to
engage in unprofitable trades if they made
inconsistent decisions. This procedure succeeded only in reducing the dollar amount of
reversals, not their frequency. These experiments used the BDM procedure or a modification of it (the O'Brien procedure) and the
random decision selection procedure; hence
the implications of the results are confined
to expected utility theory.
III. ExperimentalDesigns
Our experiments are designed to eliminate
violations of the independence and compound lottery axioms as potential explanations for observed reversals of revealed
preferences for lotteries. To do this, it is
necessary to address the issues raised by
Holt, Kami and Safra, and Segal. First, we
simply abandon the random selection procedure and pay subjects for each decision.
This, however, depending upon its implementation, creates one of two other potential
problems. If subjects are paid as each decision occurs, wealth effects might exist, as
money is accumulated between decisions. If
no payment is made until after all decisions
are made, portfolio effects might be a factor.
That is, a consistent subject might prefer
lottery A to lottery B and the portfolio (A, B)
to the portfolio (A, A). This type of portfolio choice could appear to be a choice reversal. We decided to pay subjects after each
choice and contend with possible wealth effects as the lesser of two evils, recognizing
that proceeding in this way was risky: if we
found that wealth effects could explain most
of the choice reversals then the experiments
would not have produced any useful information.
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1
2
3
4
5
6

Six
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LOTTERY PAIRS FOR THE DIRECT CHOICE QUESTIONS
OF EXPERIMENT 1

Type

Probability
of Winning

Amount
If Win (Fr)

Amount
If Lose (Fr)

Expected
Value (Fr)

P
$
P
$
P
$
P
$
P
$
P
$

35/36
11/36
29/36
7/36
34/36
18/36
32/36
4/36
34/36
14/36
33/36
18/36

4,000
16,000
2,000
9,000
3,000
6,500
4,000
40,000
2,500
8,500
2,000
5,000

-1,000
-1,500
-1,000
- 500
- 2,000
- 1,000
- 500
-1,000
- 500
-1,500
- 2,000
-1,500

3,861
3,847
1,417
1,347
2,722
2,750
3,500
3,556
2,333
2,389
1,667
1,750

Note: The lotteries used in the selling price questions are constructed by reducing every
win and lose payoff amount in the table by 1,000 francs.

Second, it was necessary that we not use
the BDM price elicitation procedure. Furthermore, we concluded that Karni and
Safra's Theorem 2 makes it highly unlikely
that anyone will be able to design a price
elicitation mechanism for choices in a lottery
space that does not require the independence
axiom. Therefore, we concluded that it would
be impossible for us to elicit true selling
prices in an experiment that is designed in
such a way that behavioral inconsistencies
with the independence axiom are not confounded with more fundamental inconsistencies with decision theory. But preference
reversals are inherently properties of inconsistent orderings. The absolute magnitude of
prices is basically irrelevant; it is the fact
that the less preferred lottery is given a higher
price that represents an inconsistency with
decision theory. We utilized this fact by asking subjects to state selling prices for both
lotteries in every pair. They were informed
that we would pay them an announced price
of 1,000 francs for the lottery to which they
had given the lower selling price, and they
would play the lottery to which they had
given the higher selling price. The payoffs for
both lotteries in every pair were reduced by
the amount of the announced price so that
the subjects were choosing between the same
probability distributions of returns in a selling price question as in the paired direct

choice question.6 In this manner we should
preserve the ordering property of the stated
selling prices despite the fact that we cannot
elicit true selling prices. That is, a subject
should still place a higher selling price on the
lottery for which a direct preference is stated.
If not, this represents a choice reversal. Since
no compound lottery is created, the independence and compound lottery axioms are not
involved.
A. Experiment 1
In experiment 1 we presented subjects with
essentially the same six pairs of lotteries
used by Grether and Plott and by Lichtenstein and Slovic (1971, experiment 3). Table
1 reports the lotteries that we used in the
direct choice questions. These are the same
as the Lichtenstein and Slovic lotteries except that our "franc" payoffs are ten times
their "point" payoffs. Our exchange rate between francs and U.S. dollars was 4,000 to 1.
This exchange rate implies dollar payoffs

6

Note that the consequences of placing a higher
price on the $ bet (P bet) in a selling price question are
exactly the same as the consequences of choosing the $
bet (P bet) in the paired direct choice question. This
would not be the case if we had failed to reduce the
lottery payoffs by 1,000 francs in the selling price questions.
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that are 1/4 the dollar payoffs in the
Grether-Plott lotteries. This reduction in dollar payoffs was necessitated by budgetary
considerations since we paid subjects for each
decision whereas Grether and Plott selected
only one of eighteen decisions for cash payoff.
The lotteries were presented to our subjects in the form of figures like those in the
Grether and Plott experiments. Some representative figures from our experiments are
contained in the Appendix. A bingo cage
containing balls numbered 1-36 was used to
generate random numbers. Subjects were informed that for each lottery, if the number
drawn was less than or equal to x, they
would win a set amount of francs, and if the
number drawn exceeded x, they would lose
a specified number of francs. The exchange
rate between francs and dollars was clearly
specified in the instructions.
Inspection of Table 1 reveals that there
are only small differences between the expected payoffs for the P and $ bets in every
pair; in fact, using the 4,000 francs to $1
conversion rate, these differences only vary
from one cent to two cents. The differences
between the expected payoffs in the paired P
and $ bets used by Grether and Plott (1979,
p. 629) varied from one cent to eight cents.
However, the probability that any one decision would be selected for cash payoff in the

TABLE 2-THE

Six

Grether-Plott experiment was 1/18. Hence,
in order to calculate the actual expected
payoffs to their subjects, one needs to divide
their expected lottery payoff figures by 18. If
one does that, and then rounds to the nearest cent, one finds that the P and $ bets in
four of their lottery pairs had the same expected payoff and there was a one-cent difference in the other two pairs. Therefore, in
both our experiment 1 and the Grether-Plott
experiments, a risk-neutral subject would incur a very small reduction in expected utility
from reversals. In order to increase the expected opportunity cost of choice reversals
for any subjects who might be risk neutral,
we designed a second experiment with larger
separations of expected lottery payoffs.
B. Experiment2
Experiment 2 was designed in the same
way as experiment 1 except that the lotteries
were different. Table 2 presents the lotteries
that we used in the direct choice questions of
experiment 2. The Table 2 lotteries were
constructed from those in Table 1 by increasing the win state payoff for one lottery
in each pair by an amount that yielded about
a 50 percent difference between the expected
payoffs for the paired lotteries. We alternated between $ and P bets in increasing
the expected payoffs. Thus, in pair 1 (Table

LoTTERY PAIRS FOR THE DIRECT CHOICE QUESTIONS
OF EXPERIMENT

Pair
1
2
3
4
5
6

413

2

Type

Probability
of Winning

Amount
If Win (Fr)

Amount
If Lose (Fr)

Expected
Value (Fr)

P
$
P
$
P
$
P
$
P
$
P
$

35/36
11/36
29/36
7/36
34/36
18/36
32/36
4/36
34/36
14/36
33/36
18/36

4,000
22,400
2,800
9,000
3,000
9,200
6,100
40,000
2,500
11,400
3,100
5,000

-1,000
-1,500
- 1,000
- 500
- 2,000
-1,000
- 500
-1,000
- 500
-1,500
- 2,000
-1,500

3,861
5,803
2,061
1,347
2,722
4,100
5,367
3,556
2,333
3,517
2,675
1,750

Note: The lotteries used in the selling price questions are constructed by reducing every
win and lose payoff amount in the table by 1,000 francs.
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2) the $ bet has an expected value that is
about 50 percent higher than the P bet,
whereas in pair 2 the P bet's expected value
is about 50 percent higher than the $ bet's
expected value, and so on in an alternating
pattern. These differences between expected
values for paired P and $ bets vary from 714
francs (18 cents) to 1,942 francs (49 cents).
IV. ExperimentalProcedures
Subjects were recruited from undergraduate economics classes at the University of
Arizona. Only one subject at a time participated in an experiment to avoid the possibility of an agent's decisions being influenced
by others' wins, losses, or decisions. Each
subject was permitted to ask questions for
clarification. As each person entered the
room, he or she was presented with a set of
written instructions which explained the nature of the lotteries and the decisions to be
made. All 36 balls were outside the bingo
cage for inspection and the subject would
place them into the cage for himself or herself. Twelve figures accompanied the instructions, each depicting a pair of lotteries. The
instructions and some of the figures for experiment 2 are contained in the Appendix.
Each subject made decisions over the six
pairs of lotteries twice. One of the times a
direct preference was stated, and the subject
immediately played the chosen lottery; the
other time selling prices were given, and the
subject played the lottery for which a higher
price was stated.7 The lower-priced lottery
was sold to the experimenter for a set fee of
1,000 francs (25 cents), regardless of the
actual quoted price. Once again, this permitted us to elicit selling prices which would be
ordered the same as the true prices without
the necessity of eliciting the true prices.
Sequential decisions over any pair of lotteries were always separated by six responses. That is, if a subject stated a direct

7If a subject reported indifference between two bets
or set equal selling prices on two bets, then the one he
or she would play was determined by a coin toss.

JUNE 1989

preference for lottery A or B in decision one,
he would state selling prices for the same
pair of lotteries in decision seven. Two and
eight were similarly related, as were three
and nine, and so on. The questions were
posed in an alternating fashion; if preferences were given in period t, then prices
were elicited in period t + 1. Half the subjects (Group I) began by stating preferences
and the other half (Group II) began by
stating prices. Therefore, for each pair of
lotteries, half the subjects stated preferences
prior to selling prices and half responded in
the reverse order.
V. Results
Thirty subjects participated in each of the
two experiments. All 60 subjects were distinct individuals. Each subject was given
$5.00 (or 20,000 francs) in working capital to
cover possible losses in the lotteries. In experiment 1, individual subject payoffs from
playing the chosen lotteries varied from $3.25
to $13.75. The average subject lottery payoff
was $7.28; hence the average total subject
payoff in experiment 1 was $12.28. Individual subject payoffs from the lotteries chosen
in experiment 2 varied from $4.25 to $25.75.
The average subject payoff from the lotteries
in experiment 2 was $10.02 and, hence, the
average total subject payment in this experiment was $15.02. On average, a subject took
21 minutes to complete experiment 1 and 23
minutes to complete experiment 2.
A. Frequency of Choice Reversals
Table 3 reports a summary of the results
from both experiments. There were three
choices of "indifferent" in experiment 1. In
the other 177 decision pairs of experiment 1,
62 (or 35 percent) were reversals. In experiment 2, 258 of 360 (or 72 percent) of the
subject's responses implied selection of the
bet with higher expected payoff in each pair.
Even so, 52 of 180 (or 29 percent) of the
decision pairs in experiment 2 were reversals.
In experiment 1, 26 of the 30 subjects, or 87
percent, reversed at least one time. Of the 30
subjects in experiment 2, 24 (or 80 percent)
reversed at least one time.
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TABLE 3-

Group

415

SUMMARY OF THE RESULTS

Total
Decisions

Consistent
Decisions

Inconsistent
Decisions

Indifference

35
27
62

3
0
3

21
31
52

0
0
0

Experiment 1
I
II
I+II

90
90
180

I
II
I+II

90
90
180

52
63
115
Experiment 2
69
59
128

B. Analysis of Possible WealthEffects
Subjects in our study were accumulating
money from lottery payoffs during our experiments. This could produce wealth effects
on subject choices over lotteries. We could
not control for possible wealth effects without using the Grether-Plott random decision
selection procedure that confounds violations of the independence and compound
lottery axioms with other sources of choice
reversals. Therefore, we have examined the
data in several ways to determine whether
wealth effects can explain the results.
Define the following variables:
1 if subject selected the $ bet in
D =

TW,_

=

A

i period t,
if subject selected the P bet in
period t;

total wealth at the end of
period t-1.

Logit analyses, using various subsamples of
the data, were done to relate the probability
that Dt =1 (rather than 0) to TW,>1 and
Dt-6 (the binary variable for the previous
selection from the same lottery pair). If no
reversals occurred there would be perfect
correlation between D, and D,_ 6 because
subjects faced the same (although slightly
"disguised") lotteries in periods t and t -6.
A significant coefficient on TW,_1 would
indicate a statistical relationship between

subject choice and wealth, and indicate a
confounding of wealth effects with inconsistent revealed preferences. Table 4 reports the
logit coefficients and t-ratios (in parentheses)
for the first set of estimations.
First consider the results for the experiment 1 data. The second column of Table 4
reports the pooled sample estimation.8 There
is clearly a significantly positive relation between decisions in period t and t - 6 (at any
reasonable confidence level) despite the observance of 35 percent reversals. The wealth
coefficient is barely significant at the 10 percent confidence level (actually, at a = 0.091).
The third and fourth columns report the
results for the subject Group I and Group II
subsamples. Group I data are for those subjects who began by stating a direct preference whereas Group II subjects began by
stating prices. Both groups show highly significant relations between decisions over the
same pair of lotteries, yet neither group exhibits significant wealth effects at the 10
percent confidence level.

8

All 180 observations, including those three in which
subjects did not indicate a strict preference between the
two lotteries are used. Two of the three are statements
of "Do not Care" when direct preference was given,
and one is a statement of identical selling prices. None
of the three is consistent with the theory; the decision
over the same pairs of lotteries when asked in the
opposite fashion is a specific choice of one lottery over
the other in each of the three cases. For this reason, the
dummy variable D,(D,-6) takes the value of 1 when
D,_6(D,) has the value 0, and D,(D,_6) takes the value
0 when D,_6(D,) has the value 1.
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TABLE 4-TESTS

FOR WEALTH EFFECTS

Experiment 2

Experiment 1
Design
Determinants

Pooled
Sample

Group I

JUNE 1989

Group II

Pooled
Sample

Group I

Group II

0.0000272 0.0000232 0.0000272 0.0000138 0.0000163 0.0000141
(0.842)
(1.223)
(1.689)
(0.959)
(1.18)
(1.363)
1.692
1.768
2.422
1.238
1.33
0.975
(4.708)
(2.752)
(4.113)
(2.11)
(3.603)
(5.333)
- 48.492
- 56.948
- 59.970 - 53.973 -107.15
-114.61
4.782
34.430
27.383
10.471
20.119
16.643
5.99
5.99
5.99
5.99
5.99
5.99
90
90
180
90
90
180

TW,_,l
D, _ 6
ln L
- 21n X
20.95

N

Note: Notation in the table is defined as follows: L is the value of the likelihood
function; X is the likelihood ratio under the null hypothesis that all of the coefficients
are jointly zero; - 21n X is distributed as a chi square with two degrees of freedom;
the critical value of the chi square variate at the 95 percent confidence level
X2 05is
with two degrees of freedom; and N is the number of observations. The figures in
parentheses are t-ratios.

TABLE 5-TESTS

FOR WEALTH EFFECTS IN INDIVIDUAL

DECISION PAIRS

Subsamples
Design
Determinants

Pair
(1,7)

Pair
(2,8)

Pair
(3,9)

Pair
(4,10)

Pair
(5,11)

Pair
(6,12)

Experiment 1
TW,-1
D, _ 6

ln L
-21nX
x20.95

N
TW,_ l
D, - 6

ln L
- 21n X
x2'095

N

0.0000359 - 0.00000172 - 0.0000510 0.0000991 0.00000706 0.0000906
(1.756)
(0.173)
(1.442)
(-1.129)
(0.844) (-0.039)
0.5010
1.413
1.029
2.713
0.4387
2.772
(2.147)
(0.530)
(2.270)
(1.785)
(1.214)
(0.603)
- 17.786
- 18.793
- 17.569
- 13.151 - 19.554 - 14.777
1.0793
3.4676
3.0528
6.2949
0.32200
7.0972
5.99
5.99
5.99
5.99
5.99
5.99
30

30

0.0000236
(0.760)
1.209
(1.501)
-18.794
4.001
5.99

0.0000264
(1.007)
0.300
(0.318)
- 18.382
1.427
5.99

30

30

30
30
Experiment 2

30

30

0.000157 - 0.0000468 0.0000413 0.0000321
(-0.773)
(1.122)
(1.298)
(1.343)
2.901
3.398
0.992
0.457
(1.770)
(1.089)
(0.549)
(1.759)
- 10.071
- 5.342 - 14.985 - 17.135
6.8908
4.011
2.625
2.382
5.99
5.99
5.99
5.99
30

30

30

30

Note: Notation in this table is defined in Table 4.

The last three columns of Table 4 report
logit estimations for experiment 2. All of
the D - 6 coefficients are highly significant
whereas none of the wealth coefficients is
significant at the 10 percent confidence level.
The preceding estimates are based on data
that are aggregated over decision pairs. The

results of logit estimations of the data from
individual decision pairs are reported in
Table 5. For experiment 1, pairs (2,8), (4,10),
and (6,12) show significantly positive relationships between decisions in period t and
decisions in period t - 6 (at 10 percent confidence level for (2,8) and 5 percent confi-
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dence level for (4,10) and (6,12)). As one
would expect, these represent the three decision pairs for which subjects made the fewest
reversals. In the (2,8) pair, 10 of 30 subjects
reversed choices. In the (4,10) pair, this proportion dropped to 7 of 30, and in the (6,12)
pair it was 6 of 30. Only one wealth coefficient, that for the (4,10) pair, is significant at
10 percent. This is noteworthy because this
one indication of significant wealth effects
occurs in the decision pair where observed
reversals are at their next-to-lowest proportion of any of the six decision pairs. No
other decision pair shows any significant relationship between choice and wealth.
The experiment 2 results in Table 5 reveal
the following. Only pairs (3,9) and (4,10)
have significantly positive relationships between decisions in period t and t -6 at the
10 percent confidence level. These are the
decision pairs for which subjects made the
fewest reversals: 5 of 30 subjects reversed
choices in (3,9) and 2 of 30 subjects reversed
in (4,10). There is no significant wealth coefficient at 10 percent confidence level for
any decision pair in experiment 2.
The logit analyses reported in Tables 4
and 5 detect little in the way of significant
wealth effects on subject decisions. But these
estimations aggregate subject responses. Perhaps there are significant wealth effects that
are not homogeneous across subjects. If one
looks at the order of decision and ignores
the type of question (selling price or direct
choice), there are two categories of choice
reversals. One category consists of those instances in which a subject initially selects the
P bet and then (six decisions later) selects
the $ bet in the paired decision. This category of inconsistent decisions will be referred to as P$ reversals. The other category,
$P reversals, consists of those instances in
which a subject first selects the $ bet and,
subsequently, selects the P bet in the paired
decision. Since in almost all cases a subject
had earned several dollars between the first
decision in a pair and the second, perhaps
the P$ ($P) reversals can be explained by
consistent subject preferences that exhibit
decreasing (increasing) risk aversion. Tests
such as those reported in Tables 4 and 5,
that aggregate across P$ and $P reversals,

417

may fail to detect wealth effects because in
the aggregate they are offsetting.
One cannot credibly argue that the same
subject exhibits both decreasing and increasing risk-averse preferences for the wealth
changes in our experiments. Therefore, one
cannot simply count the total number of
reversals of each type, but must examine the
pattern of reversals for each subject. If a
subject makes both P$ and $P reversals,
then the decisions are inconsistent with both
increasing and decreasing risk aversion and
such wealth effects cannot immunize the theory to the falsifying evidence. First consider
the individual subject results for experiment
1. If we consider only those subjects that
make P$ or $P reversals, but not both types,
we find 19 P$ reversals and 6 $P reversals.
These are accounted for by 9 subjects who
make only P$ reversals and 4 subjects who
make only $P reversals. There are 13 subjects who make both types of reversals and 4
subjects who do not reverse. Table 6 reports
logit analyses of the subsamples of the data
for the 9 subjects who make only P$ reversals and the 4 subjects who make only $P
reversals in experiment 1. The t-ratios in
parentheses do not indicate that wealth effects are significant for either group of subjects.
Next, consider the individual subject results for experiment 2. If we consider only
those subjects that make P$ or $P reversals,
but not both types, we find 9 P$ reversals
and 6 $P reversals. These are accounted for
by 7 subjects who make only P$ reversals
and 5 subjects who make only $P reversals.
There are 12 subjects who make both types
of reversals and 6 subjects who do not reverse in experiment 2. The experiment 2
results in Table 6 report logit analyses of the
subsamples of the data for the 7 subjects
who make only P$ reversals and the 5 subjects who make only $P reversals. The tratios in parentheses do not indicate that
wealth effects are significant for either group.
We interpret the results of all of these
logit analyses as follows. Changes in subject
wealth during our experiments may have affected subject decisions. However, any such
wealth effects cannot account for either the
frequency or the pattern of subject choice
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TABLE 6-TESTS

Design
Determinants
I0.00000628
TW,_,

D,_6
ln L
-21nX
2,0.95
X2'

N

JUNE 1989

OF WHETHER INCREASING OR DECREASING RISK AVERSION
CAN EXPLAIN CHOICE REVERSALS

Experiment 1
$P Reversers
P$ Reversers

Experiment 2
P$ Reversers
$P Reversers

(0.150)
14.292
(0.045)
- 23.320
17.171
5.99

-0.0000398
(-0.342)
15.157
(0.026)
- 8.2584
10.475
5.99

0.0000443
(1.032)
3.796
(3.207)
-18.221
19.378
5.99

0.00000218
(0.057)
17.595
(0.013)
- 10.094
16.465
5.99

54

24

42

30

Note: Notation in this table is defined in Table 4.

reversals. True reversals of revealed lottery
preferences are an important feature of our
subjects' decisions.
If wealth effects cannot explain the reversals then, perhaps, subject inexperience can.
Perhaps our subjects were learning about the
lotteries during the experiment and this
learning process can account for the reversals. We will next examine this question.

therefore that the frequency of reversals
might decrease significantly with more subject experience.
We performed the logit estimations that
are reported in Table 7 to test for possible
paired lottery outcome effects on subsequent
decisions. These estimations used the decision (D, 6) and wealth (TW>-1) variables
defined above and the outcome variable defined as follows.

C. Analysis of Possible OutcomeEffects
It is possible that some subjects did not
fully understand the lotteries at the beginning of the experiment. For example, an
initial selection of the $ (long shot) bet,
followed by an unlucky outcome (a loss),
might cause a subject to avoid the $ bet in
the subsequent paired decision. In experiment 1 we observed 24 instances of subjects
that exhibited $P reversals, and 53 instances
where selection of the $ bet was consistently
followed by the same selection six periods
later. Of the 24 reversals, 20 (or 83 percent)
involved a loss when the $ bet was played. In
contrast, subjects lost only 29 out of 53 (or
55 percent) of the first plays of the $ bet in
those cases where they did not reverse in
experiment 1. Any effects of lottery outcomes on subsequent decisions, unless they
are wealth effects, are incompatible with decision theories that assume well-defined risk
preferences. However, they could also indicate that the reversals are attributable to
subject inexperience with the lotteries and

OUTCMt= 6
t

OU

M

{1 if subject received the high
payoff in period t -6,
if subject received the low
=t
payoff in period t - 6.

Table 7 reports the pooled sample and group
results of the estimations for both experiments. In all columns, the coefficient on the
paired decision variable (D- 6) is highly significant. However, none of the coefficients
on the paired outcome (OUTCMt_6) and
wealth (TWt>1) variables is significant at the
10 percent confidence level. Similar estimations for individual decision pairs of both
experiments are reported in Table 8. None
of these coefficients on paired outcome is
significant at the 10 percent confidence level.
We conclude that paired lottery outcome did
not significantly affect the subjects' lottery
choices.
It might not be outcome in the paired
decision that could affect lottery selection
but, instead, outcome in the immediately
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EFFECTS
TABLE7-TESTS FORPAIREDPERIODOUTCOME
Experiment 1
Design
Determinants
TW,_i
OUTCMt 6
DI - 6
ln L
-21nX
x2,0.95

Pooled
Sample

Group I

Group II

Group I

Group II

0.0000197 0.0000192 0.0000169 0.0000131 0.0000177 0.0000105
(0.864)
(0.900)
(1.239)
(0.658)
(0.769)
(1.131)
0.5451
0.4269
0.7163
0.1105 -0.3305
0.5719
(0.818)
(0.220) (-0.425)
(0.952)
(0.633)
(1.144)
1.583
2.197
1.840
2.083
1.244
1.659
(2.524)
(3.011)
(3.917)
(3.229)
(1.948)
(3.735)
- 48.404 - 56.604
- 59.764 - 53.499 -107.13
-113.93
11.158
27.559
34.479
17.590
5.1949
21.481
7.81
7.81
7.81
7.81
7.81
7.81
90

180

N

Experiment 2
Pooled
Sample

180

90

90

90

Note: L, X, and N are defined in Table 4. Other notation in this table is defined as
follows. - 21n X is distributed as a chi square with three degrees of freedom; X3095is
the critical value of the chi square variate at the 95 percent confidence level with three
degrees of freedom.

TABLE 8-TESTS

FOR PAIREDPERIOD OUTCOMEEFFECTSIN INDIVIDUAL
DECISION PAIRS

Subsamples
Design
Determinants

Pair
(1,7)

Pair
(2,8)

Pair
(3,9)

Pair
(4,10)

Pair
(5,11)

Pair
(6,12)

Experiment 1
TW,1
OUTCM,-6
DI,- 6

In L
- 21n X
20.95

N
TW,1
OUTCM,-6
D,-6

ln L
-21nX
020.95

N

0.0000287 - 0.00000210 - 0.0000606 0.000129 - 0.0000255 0.0000807
(- 0.520)
(1.247)
(1.941)
(-1.228)
(0.545) (-0.043)
0.7792
13.863
0.8197
-2.364
0.3802
0.0194
(0.711)
(0.033)
(-1.451)
(0.517)
(0.018)
(0.233)
3.049
13.338
1.5641
1.089
1.424
0.7245
(2.331)
(0.031)
(0.701)
(1.123)
(1.430)
(0.573)
- 17.482 - 14.522
- 12.182
- 17.427
- 18.793
- 17.759
7.6069
8.2322
4.4656
3.3377
3.4679
1.1336
7.81
7.81
7.81
7.81
7.81
7.81
30
30
Experiment 2

30

30

0.0000733
(1.318)
-2.500
(-1.231)
-0.7505
(- 0.429)
- 17.897
5.794
7.81

0.0000321
(1.192)
-1.400
(-0.924)
-0.6913
(- 0.471)
- 17.898
2.394
7.81

0.000138
(1.166)
12.429
(0.019)
14.968
(0.023)
- 9.612
7.809
7.81

-0.0000324
(-0.474)
-0.9394
(-0.418)
3.022
(1.442)
- 5.266
4.164
7.81

30

30

30

30

30

30

0.0000458 0.0000347
(1.313)
(1.037)
13.219
-0.9048
(0.024) (-0.659)
13.774
-0.1803
(0.025) (- 0.138)
- 13.770 - 16.903
2.846
5.057
7.81
7.81
30

30

Note: L, X, and N are defined in Table 4. Other notation in this table is defined in
Table 7.
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TABLE9-TESTS FORPREVIOUS
PERIODOUTCOME
EFFECTS
Experiment 1
Design
Determinants
TWt,>
OUTCM,_l
Dt,- 6

In L
-21nX
2,0.95
X3
N

Pooled
Sample

Group I

0.00003185
(1.883)
-0.359755
(-1.050)
1.30221
(4.007)
-114.05
21.227
7.81

0.00003518
(1.370)
-0.802385
(-1.675)
0.960542
(2.054)
- 58.527
7.6672
7.81

180

90

Experiment 2
Group II

Pooled
Sample

Group I Group II

0.00002525 0.0000121 0.0000137 0.0000129
(1.064)
(1.178)
(0.697)
(1.103)
0.169015
0.4085
0.3784
0.3768
(0.333)
(1.164)
(0.705)
(0.797)
1.817
1.71865
2.449
1.296
(3.596)
(5.384)
(4.711)
(2.821)
- 48.241 - 56.627
53.917
-106.47
16.754
35.802
27.885
11.113
7.81
7.81
7.81
7.81
90

180

90

90

Note: L, X, and N are defined in Table 4. Other notation in this table is defined in
Table 7.

preceding period. To test for this possibility,
we performed the logit estimations reported
in Table 9. These estimations used the outcome variable defined as follows.
{

OUTCM _ f-i-M,

1 if subjectreceivedthe high
payoff in period t - 1,
0 if subject received the low
payoff in period t -1.

The coefficient on OUTCM,_1 for Group I
in experiment 1 is just significant at the 10
percent confidence level. All of the other
columns of Table 9 report insignificant coefficients on the previous period outcome
variable. However, the one significant coefficient on OUTCM,_1 is negative, indicating
that a lucky subject is less likely to choose
the long shot ($) bet on the next choice.
Table 10 reports similar estimations for individual decision pairs from both experiments.
None of these coefficients on previous period
outcome is significant at the 10 percent level.
We conclude that previous period lottery
outcome cannot account for the observed
reversals.
D. Analysis of Possible Framing Effects
In the direct choice questions, the subjects
were simply asked to indicate which one of
two lotteries in a pair they would prefer to

play. In the selling price questions, the subjects were asked to report selling prices for
both lotteries in a pair. They would then
play the lottery on which they had placed
the higher price and sell the other to the
experimenter for 1,000 francs. In addition,
the payoffs for the lotteries in the selling
price questions were uniformly lower by
1,000 francs than the payoffs for the corresponding lotteries in the direct choice questions. Thus the decision in a selling price
question is exactly equivalent in economic
terms to a choice between the lotteries in the
corresponding direct choice question. The
only difference is in the way the questions
are "framed." Psychologists have extensively
studied "framing effects" and concluded that
they significantly affect subject responses in
a variety of contexts (Slovic and Lichtenstein, 1983; Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, 1981). This leads us to ask whether
the choice reversals in our experiments can
be explained by systematic framing effects.
For example. does framing the choice as a
selling price question cause the subjects to
more or less frequently choose the $ bet than
does direct choice framing? Table 11 reports
the $ and P bet choices for both experiments disaggregated by type of question.
The nearly identical choices in the selling
price and direct choice questions in experiment 1 do not reveal any framing effect.
Subject responses to the direct choice ques-

This content downloaded from 131.96.28.172 on Mon, 11 Jan 2016 19:02:27 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

VOL. 79 NO. 3

COXAND EPSTEIN: PREFERENCE REVERSALS

421

TABLE10-TESTS FOR PREVIOUS
PERIODOUTCOME
EFFECTS
IN
INDIVIDUALDECISION PAIRS

Design
Determinants

TWt,>
OUTCM,_
D,_-6
In L
- 2ln X
2,0.95
X3

Pair
(1,7)

30

OUTCM,1
Dt,- 6

ln L
- 21n X
2,0.95
X3'

Pair
(5,11)

Pair
(6,12)

Experiment 1
0.00004986 0.000003469 - 0.00004830 0.0001057 0.0000072820.00009371
(1.018)
(0.073)
(-1.044)
(1.785)
(0.176)
(1.360)
-0.629345 -0.523611 -0.247884 -0.545925 -0.02418
-0.12346
(-0.608)
(-0.583)
(-0.294)
(-0.510)
(-0.030)
(-0.116)
0.362484
1.30338
0.987279
2.67356
0.437548
2.80971
(0.418)
(1.605)
(1.147)
(2.099)
(0.528)
(2.205)
- 17.602
-18.621
-17.526
- 19.553
-13.021
-14.771
3.8113
1.4475
3.1386
6.5534
0.32290
7.1107
7.81
7.81
7.81
7.81
7.81
7.81
78

N
TW>-1

Subsamples
Pair
Pair
(4,10)
(3,9)

Pair
(2,8)

30

0.0000195 0.0000261
(0.565)
(0.986)
0.2454
0.5322
(0.247)
(0.615)
1.312
0.1447
(1.436)
(0.149)
-18.763
-18.189
1.812
4.063
7.81
7.81

N

30

30
30
Experiment 2
0.000126
(1.201)
0.9245
(0.693)
2.986
(1.856)
-9.822
7.390
7.81

30

30

30

30

-0.0000429 0.0000424 0.0000370
(-0.712)
(1.102)
(1.459)
-13.640
-0.1464
-0.7698
(-0.017)
(-0.107)
(-0.869)
2.550
0.9821
0.3312
(1.331)
(1.073)
(0.388)
-4.546
-14.980
-16.747
5.605
2.637
3.159
7.81
7.81
7.81
30

30

30

Note: L, A, and N are defined in Table 4. Other notation in this table is defined in
Table 7.

TABLE 11-TEST

Type of
Question

FOR FRAMING EFFECTS

Number of
$ Bet Choices

Number of
P Bet Choices

Experiment 1
Direct Choice
Selling Price

87
86

91
93

Experiment 2
Direct Choice
Selling Price

89
77

91
103

tions in experiment 2 are essentially the same
as in experiment 1. The only evidence of a
possible framing effect in Table 11 is in the
subject responses to the selling price questions in experiment 2. Compared to the other
rows of the table, the last row reports a
greater proportion of P bet choices. But the
experiment 1 figures in Table 11 show no

effect of framing and this experiment has a
higher percentage of reversals than does experiment 2. We conclude that systematic
framing effects cannot explain the choice
reversals in our experiments.
VI. Interpretation
of the Results
We have found that neither wealth nor
outcome nor framing effects can account for
the choice reversals in our experiments.
Hence the results of our experiments have
implications for both the psychologists' anchoring and adjustment theory and for
economists' rational decision theory.
A. Implicationsfor the Anchoring
and Adjustment Theory
In earlier preference reversal experiments,
most reversals were of one type: subjects
were much more likely to state a preference
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for the P bet, and place a higher selling price
on the $ bet, than to make the other type of
reversal. In those experiments, very few of
the subjects who chose the $ bet failed to
order their prices consistently. Psychologists
have used the anchoring and adjustment theory to explain why the one type of preference reversal that was commonly observed in
earlier experiments was "expected" (that is,
predicted by the theory) and the other type
was not expected (Slovic and Lichtenstein,
1983, p. 597). According to this theory, in
choosing between two lotteries a subject first
anchors on probabilities of winning and then
makes an insufficient adjustment for differences in payoffs. Furthermore, in deciding
on selling prices a subject first anchors on
payoffs and then makes an insufficient adjustment for differences in probabilities. Thus
the theory postulates that the "message
space" or "response mode" substantially affects subject decisions.
In our experiment 1, 45 percent of the 62
reversals were of the previously common type
while 55 percent were of the other variety.
Similarly, in experiment 2 only 54 percent of
the 52 reversals were the expected type. Thus
we do not find the predicted asymmetry in
the reversals despite the fact that we ask our
subjects to make choices in one type of
question and to state selling prices in the
other. Furthermore, the pattern of the responses reported in Table 11 does not support anchoring and adjustment. The first two
rows reveal no effect of the type of question
on subjects' responses in experiment 1. The
experiment 2 data reveal a greater tendency
for the subjects to place higher selling prices
on P bets than to choose them in response
to direct choice questions. This is the opposite of the pattern of results that is consistent
with anchoring on dollar payoffs in selling
price questions and anchoring on probabilities in preference reporting questions.
If the anchoring and adjustment theory is
not to be contradicted by our results then
there must be something that is essentially
different about the way that we formulated
our selling price questions that can be explained by the theory. The explanation might
be based on our conjecture that most of our
subjects realized that the particular numbers
they stated for prices were irrelevant except

JUNE 1989

for their relative magnitudes. This was evidenced by their comments and by their
propensity to state prices such as 1,000 francs
for lottery A and 999 francs for lottery B in
any given (A, B) pair. However, if the anchoring and adjustment theory is to be immunized to the apparent falsifying evidence
of our experiments, it will have to be extended to incorporate more than a message
space explanation of choice reversals.
B. Implications for Decision Theory
As explained above, the results of the
Grether-Plott (1979) experiments provide an
empirical challenge to expected utility theory. However, the theoretical results of Holt,
Karni and Safra, and Segal immunized more
general decision theories to the results from
the Grether-Plott experimental design by
showing that it does not discriminate between subject violations of the independence
and compound lottery axioms and much
more problematic violations of axioms such
as transitivity.
Our experiments were designed so that the
independence and compound lottery axioms
are not required to interpret the results. The
results of our experiments differ dramatically
from those reported by Grether and Plott
and all of the other cited authors in that we
do not find the pronounced asymmetry of
the type of reversal that they reported. Taken
together, the Grether and Plott results and
our results are consistent with the hypothesis
that subject violations of the independence
axiom and/or the compound lottery axiom
can account for the asymmetry in preference
reversals that was observed in previous experiments. But that provides scarce comfort
for decision theory because we observe about
the same overall frequency of reversals
(30-35 percent) as in previous research. Furthermore, the choice reversals in our experiments are violations of the asymmetry axiom, which is an axiom of decision theory
that is even more fundamental than transitivity.9

9Asymmetry is more fundamental than transitivity in
that it is possible to develop a choice model that does
not include the transitivity axiom (Sonnenschein, 1971).
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VII. Perspective on the Results

Grether and Plott (1979, p. 623) offered
the following interpretation of the preference
reversal phenomenon:
Taken at face value the data are simply
inconsistent with preference theory and
have broad implications about research
priorities within economics. The inconsistency is deeper than the mere lack of
transitivity or even stochastic transitivity. It suggests that no optimization
principles of any sort lie behind the simplest of human choices and that the uniformities in human choice behaviorwhich
lie behind market behavior may result
from principles which are of a completely
different sort from those generally accepted.
Subsequently, Holt, Karni and Safra, and
Segal effectively immunized various generalizations of expected utility theory to falsification by the Grether-Plott and other preference reversal experiments previous to the
ones reported in our paper. But our experimental design does not require the independence and compound lottery axioms to interpret the results and we observe a high
frequency of choice reversals that are known
to be violations of the asymmetry axiom.
Must one now accept the Grether-Plott interpretation of the preference reversal phenomenon?
Results of individual choice experiments
such as ours clearly have implications for the
generality and applicability of economic theory. Experiments on preference reversal and
Bayes' rule (David Grether, 1980, 1981) have
consistently produced results that are incompatible with accepted models of rational
choice.'0 But what are the implications for
theory? In contrast to the individual choice
experiments, there is a large literature that
has obtained results in market experiments
that are generally consistent with the market
allocation implications of individual choice
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theory (Vernon Smith, 1982, 1986). This pattern of results could have either of two, quite
different implications. On the one hand, it
may turn out that we do, indeed, need to
develop fundamentally different approaches
to decision theory in order to understand
market behavior. On the other hand, it may
be that our traditional models are incomplete but not fundamentally flawed. Recalling the traditional "as if" interpretation of
economic theory, it may be the case that the
informational and disciplining properties of
economic institutions cause real economic
agents to learn to behave as if they are like
our theoretical agents. Two related lines of
research could provide the answer. One
would consist of theoretical research on the
process by which economic institutions mold
the characteristics of agents. The other would
consist of an experimental economics research program combining suitably paired
nonmarket and market choice experiments.
James Cox and Mark Isaac (1986) analyzed
these questions at length and provided an
outline of an experimental research program
that could eventually provide empirical support for either the "replace it" view of economic theory or the alternative "complete
it" view.
APPENDIX
This Appendix contains the complete instructions
(and the referenced Figure 0) given to the subjects in
experiment 2. The instructions for experiment 1 were
the same except for a reversal of the positions of the
"win 8,000" and "lose 1,000" areas in Figure 0. The
Appendix also contains two sample paired questions
(Items 1 and 7) and the corresponding Figures 1 and 7.
Each subject was asked 12 questions (Items 1-12) that
alternated between selling price and direct choice questions. The selling price and direct choice questions in
each pair were separated by five intervening questions.
Thus the sample Item 1 is the selling price question for
lottery pair 1 in Table 2. The sample Item 7 is the direct
choice question that is paired with Item 1. Complete
copies of the instructions and all questions (Items 1-12)
and figures used in both experiments are available upon
request to the authors.
INSTRUCTIONS

1A notable exception to this pattern is provided by
the experiments by Cox and Ronald Oaxaca (1988) on
search models. They found that a finite horizon (dynamic-programming) search model generally predicted
subject behavior quite accurately.

The experimenters are trying to determine how people make decisions. We have designed a simple choice
experiment, and we shall ask you to make decisions in
each of several items. Each decision you shall make will
involve two bets. When a bet is actually played, one ball
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BET A
35 36

LOSE 2000

FR.

WIN
8000

LOSE
1000 FR.

FR.

WIN
3000

FR.

12

FIGURE 0

will be drawn from a bingo cage that contains 36 balls
numbered 1-36. Depending upon the nature of the bet,
the number drawn will determine whether you lose an
amount of money or win an amount of money. Consider, as an example, the bet represented by Figure 0. If
you play this bet, you will win 8,000 francs if the
number drawn is less than or equal to 12, and you will
lose 1,000 francs if the number drawn is greater than 12.
For the purpose of this experiment, one U.S. dollar is
equal to 4,000 francs.
We are going to ask you to make two basic types of
decisions regarding the bets which are presented.
Decision Type I. When making this type of decision,
you will be presented with two bets. Then you will be
asked which bet you would prefer to play, and you will
simply play the bet which you have selected immediately following your choice. If you do not care which
bet you play, merely indicate this in the space provided,
and the bet you play will be determined by a coin toss.
Decision Type II. When making this type of decision,
you also will be presented with two bets. Then you will
be asked to state the smallest price for which you would
sell each of the bets. Once you have stated the two
selling prices (one for each bet), we will pay you 1,000
francs for the bet to which you have given the lower
selling price. Then you will be allowed to play the bet to
which you have given the higher selling price. If you
state the same selling price for the two bets, the bet you
sell to us will be determined by a coin toss.
Further Explanation. To begin, we are giving you an
endowment of 20,000 francs, or $5.00. If you were to
lose each and every bet you play, you could lose $4.50.
Therefore, if you should lose every bet, you will still
have at least $.50. This amount is your minimum possible payment for participating in this experiment. Your
maximum possible payment for participation is $53.50.

BET B
36

WIN
21,400

LOSE
2500

FR.

FR.

FIGURE 1

Do You Have Any Questions?
Item 1: Consider carefully the two bets shown in
Figure 1.
What is the smallest price for which you would sell
the opportunity to play each of these bets? We will then
pay you 1,000 francs for the bet to which you have
given the lower selling price, and you will play the bet
to which you have given the higher selling price. If your
two prices are the same, the bet you sell to us will be
determined by a coin toss.
Win/Loss
Smallest Price for Bet A:
+ 1000 Fr. =
Smallest Price for Bet B:
Item 7: Consider carefully the two bets shown in
Figure 7.
You will have the opportunity to play one of these
bets. Make one check below to indicate which bet you
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BET A
35 6 LOSE 1000 FR.

WIN
4000

FR.

BET B
36

WIN
22,400
FR.
LOSE
1500 FR.

FIGURE 7

would prefer to play. Then you will play the bet you
have selected. If you do not care which bet you play, the
one you play will be determined by a coin toss.
Bet A:
Bet B:
Do not Care:

Win/Loss
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